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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------
L. CRAIG KNUDSON, a/k/a ) 
LEWIS CRAIG KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF ) 
SOCIAL SERVICES and ) 
GOLDIE KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
Case No. 18162 
---------------------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for reimbursement for reasonable 
child support from the father of a child arising from a grant 
of public assistance by the Utah State Department of Social 
Services to the mother of the child on and for the benefit of 
the child, prior to the entry of any order of support. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Utah State Department of Social Services initiated 
administrative proceedings against L. Craig Knudson pursuant to 
Title 78, Chapter 45b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
After hearing, the administrative law judge ordered that the 
Utah State Department of Social Services was entitled to reimburse-
ment from L. Craig Knudson in the amount of $ 729.00. The admin-
istrative order was appealed to the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County and reviewed by the Court without argument 
by the parties, as the parties had stipulated that the case could 
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be decided upon the briefs filed.. The Honorable G. Hal Taylor 
upheld the administrative order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirrnance of the Lower Court's 
decision and Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as stated below, Respondents agree with the 
Statement of the Facts (and Summary of the Facts) set forth in 
the Brief of Appellant. Exceptions numbered 1, 2 and 3 are not 
deemed material to the issues rais.ed oh appeal 1 but are made 
for over-all consistency in response to Appellant's brief. The 
exceptions are as follows (page numbers refer to the Brief of 
Appellant) : 
1. statements concerning L. Craig Knudson's prior 
employment and date of employment with LaBelle's (in relation 
to the birth of the child) are not in the record (page 2) . 
2. statement that Goldie Knudson accepted the security 
deposit is not in the record (page 3). The record states only 
that a security deposit was received; but not by whom it was 
received (R. 44, 59). 
3o statements concerning details of the parties 
separation (page 3), e .. g. "grand opening" are not in the record. 
4. statement that L. Craig Knudson and Goldie Knudson 
had reached an oral agreement for free rent in lieu of cash 
support payments (page 4) is supported in the record only by 
L. Craig Knudson's assertion that he recited such an agreement to 
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a gentlemam who called him from the State of Utah (R. 46) -
there is no evidence that an agreement was made, i.e. the 
record does not state the particulars of the agreement and the 
time, date, terms and mutual consent of the parties. L. Craig 
Knudson merely stated that he did not make enough money to 
support himself and pay her obligations (R. 46) and thereafter 
believed, subjectively, that in-kind payments satisfied his 
obligations of support. There is no evidence that this was the 
agreement of Goldie Knudson. The record therefore does not support 
the second summary statement of fact (page 8) . 
5. statement that Lo Craig received the first telephone 
call during October, 1978 (page 4). He received the call October 
or November, 1978 (R. 46). 
6. the failure to state that, prior to the first 
telephon call, L. Craig Knudson received a letter from the Utah 
State Department of Social Services demanding reimbursement 
which he totally ignored (R. 46). 
7. stateme.nt that L. Craig Knudson hoped to effect a 
reconciliation is not in the record (page 4). He merely recited 
that he saw Goldie Knudson for a period on a daily basis because 
of an accident. His intentions were not stated (R. 50~51). 
8. statement that no order of temporary alimony or 
child support was entered in the divorce action because L. Craig 
Knudson was paying the expense-s associated with the housing of 
Goldie Knudson and the child (page 6 and seventh summary statement 
of fact, page 9). The record is completely silent as to the reason 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no temporary order was entered (R. 39). 
9. statement that since entry of the Decree, L. Craig 
Knudson has complied with all provisions thereof is not in the 
record (page 6). 
10. technically the statement that Goldie Knudson 
was not called as a witness at the administrative hearing is 
correct (page 7); however, she was sworn (R. 50) and, although 
the s1brict forma;lities of case presentation were not followe.d 
at the hearing, her statements are relevant. 
11. the fifth and sixth summary statements of fact 
(page 8) are not in the record but legal conclusions stating 
the facts to be as the Appellant contends them. 
It is submitted that the facts are to be presented 
and viewed favorable to the order of the Lower Court and that 
the forgoing exceptions meet that requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
To facilitate the presentation of Respondent's 
arguments, the Appellant, L. Craig Knudson, shall hereinafter 
be referred to as "CRAIG"; the Respondent, Goldie Knudson, 
shall hereinfter be referred to as "GOLDIE"; and the Respondent, 
Utah State Department of Social Services, shall hereinafter 
be referred to as "DEPARTMENT". 
POINT I: THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES' RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT 
IS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCRTINE OF RES 
JUDI CATA 
The Appellant accurately states the basic principles 
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of res judicata, .namely: 
(1) the present case involves the same parties or 
their privies as the prior action; 
(2) a final order or judgment has been rendered in 
the prior action; and 
(3) the issue in question in the present case 
was actually raised and decided, or could have 
been raised and decided, in the prior action. 
Respondents agree with the Appellant that in the instant case, 
the second principle (or standard) has been met; but contends 
that neither the first principle nor the third principle are 
met. The divorce action, GOLDIE KNUDSON, plaintiff, vs. 
L. CRAIG KNUDSON, defendant, in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, Stateof Utah, Civil number 71529, 
constitutes the prior action under the Appellant's res judicata 
argument. It is· submitted that (a)· the instant case involves 
neither the same parties nor their privies as the prior action; 
and (b) the issue in question in the instant case was neither 
raised, nor could have been raised, in the prior action. 
The key factor to be 2 considered is that on November 
29, 1978, Goldie assigned to the Department all monies payable 
to her or for her child from Craig. The Assignment of 
Collection of Support Payments is part of the record (R. ) 
and a copy is included in the appendix, page20, marked Exhibit 
A. It is clear that the Assignment of Collection of Support 
Payments was a complete and total assignment of all rights to 
collect support from Craig. Under the well established 
principles of assignments, at the time Goldie filed an action 
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for divorce, she had no legal right to collect, or attempt 
to collect, support from the Appellant for any month during 
which she had received public assistance from the Department .. 
When the Appellant argues that the "Department 
freely admitted in the course of its argument (R .. 144) that 
it is in privi ty with a party to the prior proceeding 
(Goldie) .... " and asserts privity with Goldie (a) as a matter 
of fact by virtue of a written contract and (b) as a matter 
of law because of the derivative nature of the Department's 
claim, the Appellant misstates the legal effect of the 
assignment. Once an assignment is made, the assignee is the 
real party in interest and entitled to maintain an action 
on the assigned righto Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1962); Campbell v. Peter, 162 P.2d 754 (Utah 1945). 
The assignor cannot sue the debtor. First National Bank of 
Topeka v. United TelephoneAss'n Inc., 353 P.2d 963 (Kan. 1960); 
Wyoming Wool Marketing Ass'n vs. Urruty, 394 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 
1964); Harambee Enterprises, Inc. v. State Board of Agriculture, 
511 P. 2 d 5 O 3 (Co lo. 19 7 3) • 
In the case of International Resources v. Danfield, 
599 Po2d 515 (Utah 1979) this Court ruled that the doctrine 
of res judicata does not bar an assignor from maintaining an 
action against a debtor even though the assignee had brought 
a prior action. In the case of Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK 
Corp., 571 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1977) this Court similarly ruled 
that a mortgagee (assignee) was not barred from maintaining 
an action since it was not party to prior litigation by the 
defendant. It is therefore clear that und~r a~f;i anmPnt-_ law· 
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the assignee and assignor are not considered to be in 
privity so as to support a defense of res judicata. 
On November 29, 1978, Goldie had not filed for 
divorce. Appellant urges that the Department's failure to 
appear in the divorce action is fatal. The record does not 
present any evidence that the Department had notice of the 
divorce action. To assert that such failure to appear 
jeopardizes the Department's assigned rights, the Appellant 
must have established that the Department had notice of the 
divorce proceeding and opportunity to be heard. In the case 
of Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978), the defen-
dant-respondent had argued that a prior action by others who 
had identical claims to the plaintiff-appellant gave ri·se to 
the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment. In 
ruling in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, this Court stated 
(citation omitted) at pages 343 and 344: 
As to the matter of collateral es-
toppel, it is to be noted Ruffinengo 
.was not a party nor in privity with a 
party in the prior suit against Miller. 
Consequently, he cannot be bound by 
that proceeding. Collateral estoppel 
is not a defense as against a litigant 
who was not a party to the action and 
judgment claimed to have created an 
estoppel. 
The proposition was clearly stated 
in Blonder-T·ongue v. Uni ve·rsi ty of 
r·llinois Foundation as follows: 
Some litigants--those who 
never appeared in a prior 
action--may not be collater-
ally estopped without liti-
gating the issue. They never 
had a chance to present their 
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evidence and arguments on 
the claim. Due process 
prohibits estopping them 
despite one or more existing 
adjudications of the identi-
cal issue which stand squarely 
against their position. 
It is also to be noted that if the 
doctrine should be applied to these 
facts that Ruffinengo would be denied 
his constitutional right to appeal 
because he was not a party to the 
prior sui to 
0 • 0 •c. 
Miller's further contention that 
Ruffinengo was "in privity" simply 
because he had an identical right to 
his neighbor's that was 9reviously 
adjudicated is not persuasive. This 
is so for two basic reasons: 
(1) It is not at all unfore-
seeable that Ruf finengo might 
reach a different result than 
did the other lot owners in the 
prior suit, simply because he 
may present a far different 
or convincing case. 
(2) This court has a consistent 
policy of resolving doubts in 
favor of permitting parties to 
have their day in court on the 
merits of the controversy. 
To rule in the instant case that the divorce action by Goldie 
barred action by the Department on its assigned right would 
result in denying the Department due process under the law. 
The Department would also be denied their constitutional right 
of appeal. The other considerations stated in the above quote 
similarly have bearing on this matter. 
The mere fact that the Department's Assistance Payments 
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Administration Office approves an application for public 
assistance for a person, and takes update information there-
after at approximate six-month intervals, does not mean that 
such person advises the Department of every thing they sub-
sequently do. Goldie was initially asked about any divorce 
action, but none was pending at the time of her application. 
The Department was not notified when the divorce complaint 
was filed or the divorce hearing was conducted. The Depart-
ment, as assignee, had a legally protected right to reim-
bursement. The written assignment cannot now be ignored, or 
in effect rescinded, by saying that Goldie somehow reassurned 
those rights at the time of the divorce -- in essence --
rewriting the agreement of the Department and Goldie -- and 
adjudicated the Department's rights with violating the due 
process and right of appeal of the Department. 
The divorce proceedings were conducted upon a 
written Stipulation and Property Agreement between Goldie 
and Craig· (R. 66, 69), Section 78-45b-3 (4), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, provides: 
(4) No agreement between any obligee 
and any obliger either relieving an 
obliger of any duty of support or respon-
sibility therefor or purporting to settle 
past, present, or future support obligations 
either as settlement or prepayment s~all 
act to reduce or terminate any rights of 
the department to recover from that obliger 
for support provided unless the department 
has consented to the agreement in writing. 
This section has direct bearing on the assigned rights of the 
Department. No agreement even those made in an uncontested 
divorce action -- can act to terminate any rights -- especially 
-9-
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those vested by written assignment -- of the Department to 
recover from an obliger unless consented to in writing by the 
Departmento This provision protects the Department's rights 
of due process and appealo These rights are also protected 
by statute under Section 78-45-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, which require an obligee who has received public 
notice 
assistance to give/in writing to the Department of any action 
(including a divorce action) which involves the recovery of 
support. There being no evidence that the Department had 
notice of the divorce proceedings, they cannot be bound, nor 
can their previously assigned rights be jeopardized in the 
divorce proceedingo 
Further, in the case of Searle Bros. v. Searle, 
588 P.2d, 689 (Utah 1978), this Court at page 691 gave a 
legal definition of a person in privity with another and 
stated: "Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or 
decrees of court, privity means une who interests has been 
legally represented at the time.'" At page 692, 46 Am. Jur. 
2d. Judgments, Sec. 530, was quoted with approval~ to-wit: 
A party to the principal case is 
regarded as a stranger to the judgment 
rendered in the previous action where 
he was not directly interested in the 
subject matter thereof, and had no 
right to make defense, adduce testimony, 
cross-examine witnesses, control the 
proceedings or appeal from the judgment, 
even though he could have made himself 
a party to the previous action. The 
right to intervene in an action does not, 
in the absence of its exercise, subject 
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one possessing it to the risk of 
being bound by the result of the 
litigation, under the doctrine 
of res judicata .... 
{Emphasis added) 
The Searle case involved claims tied to a divorce proceeding. 
In the instant case, Goldie had assigned her right to receive 
support and did not attempt in any way in the divorce pro-
ceedings to legally represent the Department's. The Appellant 
places great weight in the fact that Goldie filed an Affidavit 
for Order to Show Cause in the divorce action. The me-.r.e filing 
of the affidavit is not legally significant since this Court 
has nothing else before ite The record is void as to whether 
an order to show cause was issued, a hearing was conducted, etc. 
Conjecture that Goldie realized after filing the affidavit 
that she could not pursue an assigned right is just as 
plausible as the Appellant's unsupported position that no order 
was entered because Craig was already providing support. 
The Appellant cites the cases of Mecham v. Mecham, 
570 P.2d 342 {Utah 1979} and Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 
{Utah 1978). In the Mecham case, an explanation was made that 
the Department's right of reimbursement were derivative and 
no greater than Maxine Mecham's rights. The first important 
distinction with the instant case is that a written assignment, 
and the appertenant legal significances of a written assign-
ment, were not at issue or even mentioned. There can be two 
forms of derivative rights. First, those assigned as in the 
instant case. Such rights in the assignee are no greater than 
which the assignor possessed at the time of the assignment. 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Second, statutory rights as in the Mecham case. The statutory 
rights arise under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act, Section's 78-45-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, and the Public Support of Children Act, Sections 
78-45b-l et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. These 
rights are also no greater than those possessed under the law 
by a support obligee and are specified in the statuteso 
While neither type of derived right is enlarged, the legal 
rights which vest and the protections afforded those rights 
are different. The Mecham case properly decided the Department's 
rights under a statutory right of reimbursement, but did not 
decide the effects of a valid, written assignment. Other 
distinctions with the instant case are: 
{l) the Complaint for Divorce in Mecham case sought 
temporary alimony and child support; no evidence in the 
instant case o 
{2) in the Mecham case, specific orders were made 
denying past alimony and requiring the parties to pay debts 
incurred since the filing; no such orders in instant case. 
{3) the Department is not herein trying to modify the 
decree of divorce, but to enforce their assigned right of 
reimbursement which was clearly recognized in the cases of 
Reeves v. Ree~, 556 P.2d 1265 {Utah 1976) and State Division 
of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 {Utah 1976). 
In the Roberts case, the judgment of the Department 
was upheld because the Department had received notice of the 
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divorce proceeding and intervened. This case also dealt 
with statutory rights, not assigned rights, and properly 
decided the Department's rights under a statutory right of 
reimbursement. It, however, also did not decide the effects 
of a valid, written assignment. 
POINT II: THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARING 
At the administrative hearing the Appellant ~as 
represented by counsel and testified at great length concerning 
his and Goldie's wealth, income and living standards. The 
administrative law judge also considered the Affidavit of 
Goldie (filed in the divorce action) (R.86), which affidavit 
was introduced at the hearing by the Appellant. The evidence 
presented covered both. the period they lived together as 
husband and wife and the period they lived separate and apart. 
The purpose of the hearing was to determine Craig's liability, 
if any, under the assignment for the period December, 19781 
through July, 1979. Since this was an assigned right1 the 
Department could proceed to determine the liability under any 
available method. The Department choose the Public Support 
of Children Act. For the period in question no court order 
existed 1 but the Department had enforceable legal, and assigned, 
right of reimbursement as stated in the cases of State Division 
of Fa.mily Services v. elark, 554 P. 2d 1310 (Utah 1976) and 
Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1976). 
Section 78-45b-6(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, which provides: 
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(2) The administrative hearing 
examiner, after full and fair hearing, 
conducted in accordance with the rules 
and regulations of the dep.artment shall 
make specific findings regarding the 
liability and responsibility, if any, 
of the alleged responsible parent and 
the amount of sich liability computable 
on the basis of the amount of assistance 
paid or to be paid. In making these 
findings, the hearing officer shall 
include in his deliberations the 
necessities and requirements of the 
child, exclusive of any income of the 
custodian of said child, the amount of 
the support debt claimed, the amount of 
assistance paid or to be paid, the 
abilities and resources of the responsible 
parent, and the public policy and intent 
of the legislature to require that 
children be maintained from the resources 
of responsible parents thereby relieving 
to the greatest extent possible the 
burden upon the general citizenry through 
welfare programs .... 
and Section 78-45~7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
are appropriate statutes by which the hearing was conducted. 
One relevant factor to be considered is that within one year 
from the period in question the decree of divorce set child 
support payments at $150.00 per month. The evidence developed 
at the hearing clearly demonstrated that the circumstances of 
Craig and Goldie were not materially different during the 
period and at the time of the divorce. The administrative law 
judge is entitled to take notice of the decreed amount and make 
a conclusion that the amount was also fair and reasonable for 
the approximate year period preceeding the divorce. The adminis-
trative law judge did not assess Craig for all of the public 
assistance payments in violation of pronouncement in the second 
-14-
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to last paragraph of the Roberts case. A lower court is 
allowed reasonable discretion in considering the relevant 
factors outlined and should not be reversed absent a showing 
in the record of abuse of the discretion. Otero v. Williams, 
Case No. 16819 (Utah, filed May 8, 1980). The Appellant 
had a full and fair hearing which allowed him to present his 
case and which adduced sufficient information for the adminis-
trative law judge to make a determination of support during 
the period. 
POINT III: A SUPPORT OBLIGOR IS NOT 
UNCONDITIONALLY ENTITLED TO CREDIT 
FOR IN-KIND PAYMENTS 
In the instant case Craig testified that Goldie told 
him she was to receive public assistance and that he would be 
contacted by "welfare" (R. 45). He totally ignored their first 
dunning (R.46) and claimed that they agreed to his mode of 
payment to Goldieo Such a claim was not accepted. The 
Department's immediate initiation of the notice of Determination 
of Financial Responsibility demonstrates the Department's failure 
to agree to his mode of payment. The evidence is not contra-
verted that Craig did pay certain expenses for Goldie, mainly 
shelter expenses. The administrative law judge allowed him 
credit for the expenses paid that were actual costs, i.e. the 
lot rental, but refused to allow credit for equity payments. 
The Appellant asserts that he could have rented the trailer as 
an alternative, but this does not take into account the interest 
Goldie acquired in the property during their marriage. Although 
-15-
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title was in Craig's name, Goldie owned an equity in the 
trailero Respondents cannot find case authority dealing 
with pre-divorce in-kind payments.. The intent of child 
support is to allow the custodial parents latitude in 
deciding the needs of the child and not to permit the non-
custodial parent to dictate where the monies are to be 
expended. This intent is clearly stated in the case of Ross 
v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979) where at pages 603-604 it 
is stated (footnotes omitted): 
Plaintiff is entitled, however to 
credit for expenditures made on behal.f 
of the children or defendant which do 
not specifically conform to the terms 
of the decree. To do so would permit 
plaintiff to vary the terms of the 
decree and to usurp from defendant the 
right to determine the manner in which 
the money should be spent. Only if 
the defendant has consented to the 
plaintiff's voluntary expenditures as 
an alternative manner of satisfying 
his alim0ny and child support obligation, 
can plaintiff receive credit for such 
expenditures .. 
The Appellant argues that an agreement between Craig and Goldie 
' 
is operative, but such is not supported by the record. The 
annotation "Right to Credit.on Accrued Support Payments for 
Time Which Child is in Father's Custody or for Other Voluntary 
Expenditures," 47 ALR 3d 1031, deals with the "in lieu of" 
payments relating to accrued child support payments under a 
divorce decree. However,. the same factual problems exist 
whenever the Court delves into what sort of monetary value 
should be given. Undoubtedly these factual problems have given 
-16-
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rise to the general rule "that the father is not entitled 
as a matter of law to credit for such voluntary expenditures 
when they are made in a manner other than that specified 
by the support order or divorce decree .. " (47 ALR 3d, page 
1039). The general rule is sound because if you begin making 
exceptions there is no factual or legal criteria upon which 
to base such exceptions. At what point do benefits begin 
and end, how are the benefits determined, and how much credit 
should be given are just a few of the questions that come to 
mind if petitioner's theories are followed. The benefit theory 
espoused could only lead to an administrative and ~egal night-
mare. This is particularly true when the Department is involved, 
rather than the parties to the marriage. 
The Appellant suggests the Department is substituting 
rubrics for reasoning in proposing that there was enrichment 
to Craig in making the trailer payments, and that the order of 
the Administrative Law Judge was entered on the same basis. 
The reasoning for the Department's position is that if the 
payments are made for a trailer, a home or a castle and the 
obliger is a benefactor to any degree in the increased value 
involved, then he is in fact enriched. In today's housing 
market that enrichment may well be a considerable amount. 
The obvious problem is that the extent of the enrichment 
becomes extremely difficult to determine. Should the amount be 
ascertained by selling the trailer or home, by an appraisal 
acceptable to all parties, by a bonefide offer or some other 
-17-
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formula? Who should participate in the increased equity value 
and to what extent? Should the Department provide support for 
children in all cases while the obliger makes house payments? 
As a practical matter, the problems become insurmountable. 
What is the simple solution? Prohibit the "in lieu of" payments. 
This solution is certainly not an illogical and incompre-
hensible theory as suggested by the petitioner, but represents 
a workable and sound basis for the resolution of the factual 
and legal problems which are inherent with the petitioner's 
proposed theories. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Reeves case, this Court stated "children are 
unconditionally entitled to support from their parents and the 
State is authorized by law and should be encouraged and aided 
as a matter of public policy to see that the responsibility 
is borne by them both intitially and in any necessary subsequent 
proceedings". L. Craig Knudson may have assisted Goldie Knudson 
out of his desire to become reconciled to her. There is no 
basis under the law, however, to transfer his obligation to 
support his dependent minor child to the taxpayers of the State 
of Utah. Both the administrative law judge and the District 
Court properly ruled that L. Craig Knudson owes some duty of 
reimbursement to the State Department of Social Services. The 
duty placed upon him is not onerous and was reasonably and 
fairly adjudicated. The facts in this case support an order 
upholding the decision of the District Court. 
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court 
sustained the decision of the lower courte 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. BARCLAY 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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Utah=DSS-APA 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVlCES 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES 
ASSIGNMENT OF COLLECTION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
Form 621 
Rev o 11/77 
For public assistance received or to be received, or for action on the part 
of the De rtment of Social Services to effect collection of $upport, 
I, .54?7-~(;L/lJ4--
(Soc., Sec.. No. ) 
hereby assign, transfer and set over to the Department of Social' Services, 
Office of Recovery Services, all monies payable to me or my child from any 
person as support or alimony. Said assigned amount shall be the amount -
past due or to become due me or my child. 
I further authorize anyone whosoever, to deliver to the Department of 
Social Services, Office of Recovery Services, any and all drafts, checks, 
money orders or other negotiable instruments to be used by any person 
obligated to provide support or alimony.. The Office of Recovery Services 
is hereby granted the power of attorney to act in my name in endorsing and 
cashing of any and all drafts, checks, money orders or other negotiable 
instruments received by the Department as support or alimony payments. 
I agree to send or deliver to the Office of Recovery Services any and all 
support or alimony I may receive for the period of time I receive public 
assistance. I agree that I will not seek to collect child support and 
alimony through any alternative method while this assignment is in force. 
I authorize the assignee to do every act it deems necessary to collect the 
support of alimony payments, including, but not limited to, taking any and 
all legal action it deems necessary or the compromising of my or our claims 
without further notice to me. 
Signature Date 
~-~--------------
Address 7J ~ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, this c>2tf ~ day of 
_7/._...........~......_-_!t<d;tL _ _  ' ___ . ' _ , 191 f. 
My Corrmission Expires: 
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